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MODELS OF GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 
PETER LARMOUR 
The contribution of 
AusAID to this series 
is acknowledged with 
appreciation. 
Writing on governance and development typically 
distinguishes two meanings (Lefi:wich 1993; 
Williams and Young 1994).The first, 'good 
government', is concerned with legitimacy, 
accountability and the limits of state power 
(Moore 1993). The second, originally invoked by 
the World Bank (1989: 60), is more concerned 
with the ability to govern effectively. Here I want 
to consider applications of a third meaning, which 
sees governance as the result of the interaction 
between different models of coordination, 
including markets and communities, as well as 
hierarchy, the state or 'the government' (Campbell, 
Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1991 ; Kooiman 1993; 
Larmour 1994) . 
A triangular relationship between models of 
organisation was first suggested by Polanyi (1957). 
To study the economy as an 'instituted process' he 
proposed an expanded 'tool box,' which combined 
Redistribution 
(hierarchy) 
Exchange 
(market) 
Reciprocity 
(community) 
Figure 1 Polanyi's forms of integration 
reciprocity, which assumes symmetry between 
participants; redistribution, which assumes 'some 
measure of centricity'; and exchange which 
requires 'a system of price making markets ' 
(1957: 25) . Polanyi's 'forms of integration', which 
correspond to community, hierarchical and market 
models of organisation, are shown in triangular 
form in Figure 1. 
Any actual process of organising typically 
involves a mix of ideal typical models (Colebatch 
and Larmour, 1993). Ideas about hierarchy, 
community and markets are used by participants to 
make sense of organizations, and urge reforms, as 
well as by academics analysing them from outside. 
Extending the idea that market failure justified 
government intervention, the 'failures' of any one 
model provide reasons for the introduction of 
another (1993: 28-39). Thus 'state failure' might be 
corrected by the creation or revival of'community' 
forms of organisation, as when community-based 
non-governm.ent organisations are called upon to 
redress the failures of top-down policy 
implementation. 
Hierarchy, market and community do not 
exactly correspond to three 'sectors' (public, private 
and voluntary, non-profit or 'third' sector). 
Relations within the public sector, for example, are 
not all or exclusively hierarchical. Government 
departments are partly organised by professional 
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norms and values, as well as by self-interested 
exchanges, as in the 'internal markets' being 
introduced for health care in New Zealand and 
Britain. While they may have a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence, governments are often 
reluctant to use coercion. Similarly, the 'private 
sector' is partly organised by government 
legislation, while large firms may be as bureaucratic 
and rule-bound as any government department. 
Voluntary organisations develop bureaucratic 
forms, and compete with each other for clients, 
members or donations. So each existing sector 
contains a shifting mixture of models of 
organising, though one may predominate. 
This article uses a triangular model to assemble 
three lines of theorising: the movement for 
'bringing the state back in' to political science 
(Evans et al. 1985;Jessop 1990; Poggi 1990); the 
new interest in institutional economics (Hodgson 
1988; North 1990); and the revival of economic 
sociology (Friedland and Robertson 1990; 
Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). Each is a kind of 
'new institutionalism' in the sense that it believes 
that institutions matter in structuring the 
alternatives available to individual actors, and 
shaping their preferences (March and Olsen 1989). 
Each links two corners of the triangle of hierachy, 
market and community. 
Then it considers how the triangle might be 
extended in time and space, and at two theoretical 
issues it raises-the problem of drawing a line 
between state, society and economy, and its basis in 
model of a rational, self interested individualism. 
While the main purpose of the article is 
theoretical, it concludes by suggesting how a 
'governance' approach might be applied to 
development administration and training. Concern 
with the intersection of hierarchy, market and 
community has a sharp practical edge where 
governments seek rapid economic growth, or 
where command economies have collapsed. 
Polanyi's model was originally applied to pre-
modern economies. It has been staple of 
development economics that community structures 
may resist the introduction of markets, and that the 
state should act to correct market failures-at least 
until what Toye (1987) called the 
'counterrevolution' of the 1980s which rejected 
earlier rationales for intervention. Neo-liberalism 
or the New Political Economy noticed that 'the 
state' might 'fail' too (Colclough and Manor 1991; 
Findlay 1990). The New Institutionalist or 
governance literature deals mainly with the 
organization of advanced industrial societies 
(Powell and diMaggio 1991; Steinmo et al. 1992). 
However, Ostrom (1990) provided a number of 
cases from developing countries involving 
governance of natural resources. I applied a 
triangular model of'market', 'bureaucracy' and 
'community' to land management in Melanesia 
(Larmour 1990), and Hamilton and Biggart's 
(1988) tripartite analysis ofbusiness organisation 
and development in East Asia is discussed below. 
The three simple models are related to more 
complex theoretical objects ('state', 'economy' and 
'society') and to disciplinary distinctions between 
political science, economics and sociology. For the 
purposes of this paper, hierarchy is treated as 
equivalent to the state, market to the economy and 
community to society. Each side of the triangle 
will be looked at from two directions: the state-
society relationship from the 'hierarchy' corner, and 
then from the 'conmmnity' corner; the state-
economy relationship from the 'hierarchy' corner 
and the 'market' corner; and so on. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
HIERARCHY AND 
COMMUNITY 
Theorists of'bringing the state back in' have 
distinguished between 'society-centred' view of the 
relationship, and their own more 'state-centred' 
views. Skocpol (1985: 4-7) argued that both 
Marxism and pluralism are 'society-centred' in that 
they explain state activity in terms of economic 
and social conditions: modes of production, or 
interest group pressures. Marxists tend to see the 
state as an effect of more fundamental social 
conflict-once this is resolved, then the state can 
revert to more technical and administrative activity. 
Pluralism is also 'society-centred' in so far as it 
explains state action as the result of voter demands 
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or pressure group activity. 
A strongly society-centred view is Adam 
Smith's famous 'three duties of the sovereign' 
• first, the duty of protecting the society from 
the violence and invasion of independent 
societies 
• second, the duty of protecting , as far as 
possible, every member of the society from the 
injustice and oppression of every other 
member of it, or the duty of establishing an 
exact system of justice 
• third, the duty of erecting and maintaining 
certain public works and certain public 
institutions, which it can never be for the 
interest of any individual, or small number of 
individuals, to erect and maintain, because 
profit could never repay the expense to any 
individual, or small number of individuals, 
though it may frequently do much more than 
repay it to a great society (quoted in Alt and 
Chrystal 1983: 16). 
Instead, state-centred explanations look at the 
state in its own terms, looking sideways to other 
states, as well as downwards to the populations and 
territories governed. The relationship between state 
and society is often seen as fundamentally elitist 
and extractive, as the state uses domestic resources 
to prosecute its competition with other states. For 
example, 'bringing the state back in' to the politics 
of development Migdal (1988) developed a 
typology of weak and strong states and societies in 
which chiefs and local strongn1en constituted 
strong societies that could resist the penetration of 
states. Migdal defines state strength in terms of the 
ability of state elites to impose their preferences on 
the rest of society, measured by popular 
compliance with legislation, popular participation 
in state run institutions, and the legitimacy 
accorded by the population to state elites (Migdal 
1988: 32). 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
HIERARCHY AND MARKET 
As with state-society relations, we can distinguish 
'state centred' and 'economy centred' views of the 
relationship. The classic state-centred view is 
mercantilism, which saw foreign trade as an 
instrument of state aggrandisement. It is echoed 
more weakly in modern ideas that economic 
development is meant to serve state interests, for 
example in catching up with other states, or 
developing an industrial base that can support 
industry to defend the state against others (for 
example the idea of'strategic' rather than 'free' 
trade is 'state-centred'). 
Looking from the 'economy' corner of the 
triangle, the idea of'market failure' provides an 
economy-centred justification for the state. It refers 
to the absence of the conditions of a freely 
competitive market. The standard list includes 
• natural monopolies, caused by low marginal 
compared to average costs, such as in a 
telephone network that deters new entrants 
• externalities, or costs and benefits that fall on 
third parties, and so are not taken into account 
in the decision to start up, or terminate an 
activity 
• information and transaction costs which inhibit 
trading 
• the existence of public goods (the latter being 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, so that 
private producers see no incentive in providing 
them, however beneficial they might be for 
others). 
Each failure provides a justification for state 
intervention: to regulate natural monopolies, to 
force producers to internalise externalities, to 
reduce information and transaction costs, and to 
supply public goods. However, the list of natural 
monopolies has shortened. For example so-called 
natural monopolies are subject to competition 
from substitutes (trucks compete with rail 
networks, for example) or from the mere threat of 
hit-and-run entry into contestable markets. The 
state may arrange for regular 'competition for the 
field' rather than insist on more than one supplier. 
Similarly, the creation of new forms of property 
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right may do a more efficient job as the regulation 
of externalities (Alchian and Demsetz 1973). A 
tradable right to a quiet night's sleep might replace 
noise abatement laws. Noisy neighbours could buy 
the right out, or move their party elsewhere. More 
sophisticated forms of charging (such as road 
pricing), and contracting out may remove most of 
the justifications for state provision of public goods 
(the list of which was quite small anyway). 
North's 'neoclassical theory of the state' sees the 
state-economy relationship as one of dynamic 
exchange, rather than to or fro determination of 
one by the other. On the one hand rulers seek to 
provide property rights that will balance their need 
to tax with the need to facilitate economic growth 
to provide revenue. On the other hand 
constituents seek to maximise their profits, 
including seeking the grant of monopolies from 
rulers, or by supporting rival rulers. The result, 
argues North, is contradictory and inefficient. 
However the tendency of people to prefer to free 
ride, if they can, on the actions of others will stifle 
the possibility of collective action to install more 
efficient regimes that would be to everyone's 
benefit (North 1981: 20-32). 
North's later work (1990) draws on the 
transaction costs approach to institutions pioneered 
by Coase ( 1 9 51) and Williamson (Williamson and 
Ouchi 1981), who explained the existence of 
hierarchically organised firms, with all their 
inefficiencies, as a response to the relatively greater 
costs of making and keeping contracts on the 
market. At some point it becomes cheaper to do 
things 'in house'. Firms are thus 'islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious 
cooperation' (Robertson quoted in Coase, 
1951: 333), and the state is 'super-firm' in the sense 
that it is 'able, if it wishes, to avoid the market 
altogether, which a firm can never do' (Coase 
1960: 17). The state-economy boundary adjusts to 
the shifting balance of transaction costs and 
hierarchical inefficiencies. However, the fine-tuning 
of the state-economy relationship can become 
stuck. Not only do inefficient institutions get 
locked into place by the organisations that benefit 
from them, but high transaction costs and 
imperfect information prevent more than 
incremental change (1990: 7-8). 
While the boundary of market activity has 
been expanded by the criticisms of traditional ideas 
of market failure, supporters of the market have 
also jumped across the boundary and taken their 
ideas into their opponents' camp. 'Public choice' 
refers to 'the economic study of non-market 
decision making' (Mueller 1989: 1), particularly the 
application of the assumptions of rational self 
interested behaviour to institutions such as the 
state. So in spite of its origins in economics, public 
choice is 'state-centred' to the extent that it views 
the state not as the residual of market activity, but 
as a new field in which to try out methods of 
anaysis developed to understand the economy. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MARKET AND COMMUNITY 
An 'economy-centred' view of the relationship 
between economy and society looks at how trust 
emerges to stabilise cooperative relationships, and 
inhibit opportunism. This can be examined 
experimentally, for example in versions of the 
famous 'Prisoners' Dilemma' game, in which each 
side has an incentive to defect from cooperative 
behaviour that, if both followed it, would leave 
both better off. Axelrod (1990), for example, 
showed how cooperation evolved over repeated 
plays of the game as partners tested and gained 
confidence in each other. 
A 'society-centred' view of the economy-
society relationship works from the other corner of 
the triangle. Polanyi, for example, developed the 
triangular model in Figure 1 as a way of explaining 
how the the economy is 'embedded' in social 
institutions. However, as Swedberg points out, to 
say that the economy is embedded still accepts that 
it is somehow distinct from 'society' (Swedberg 
1987: 11 0). A more radically 'society-centred' 
account of the relationship would seek to 
reconstruct economic models of the market in 
sociological terms. For example, Harrison proposes 
a sociological account of markets (Swedberg 1987: 
11 0-112). Rather than seeing markets in economic 
terms as outcomes of independent decisions to 
trade homogeneous products, Harrison seeks to 
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explain the persistence and stability of markets in 
which products are more or less distinct. Rather 
than acting independently-a condition of the 
model of a freely competitive market-Harrison 
argues that firms take account of each others past 
behaviour to select niches for the future. The 
market persists as a stable structure because 
individuals act together as if it will-a sociological, 
rather than an economic explanation. To the extent 
they are successful in judging the market, it will 
persist. 
EXTENDING THE TRIANGLE 
The simple triangle of'hierarchy', 'market' and 
'community' can be extended in two ways: in 
time, to account for historical changes and in 
space, to account for differences between places. 
Extending the triangle back through time, the 
process of development is often seen as one of 
increasing differentation between state, society and 
economy, or of increasing domination of one form 
('the market') over the others. The 'relative 
autonomy' of each is seen a characteristic of 
advanced industrial societies. Pre-modern 
institutions such as chieftaincy combined social, 
political and economic activities. If so, the triangle 
extends back by convergence to a single point of 
institutional fusion. The experience ofThatcherism 
and Reaganism, the collapse of the planned 
economies, and the 'counter-revolution' in 
development theory suggest that the market model 
became more predominant in the 1 980s. 
Extending the triangle in space, different 
combinations of hierarchy, market and community 
are often invoked to explain differences in 
economic performance between countries. 
Modernisation theory saw custom as an obstacle to 
development, while critics of liberalism point to 
the visible hand of the state behind rapid 
industrialisation in East Asia. Hamilton and Biggart 
(1988) make more sophisticated use of the three 
models, which they called a 'market cultural' and 
'political economy' and 'authority' approaches to 
explain differences in industrial organisation 
between South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Business 
in South Korea was typically organised in large, 
hierarchical firms (chaebol). In Taiwan the small to 
medium-size family firm predominated, while 
Japanese business was organised around networks 
of big firms and their suppliers. In spite of these 
differences, all three countries developed rapidly 
from a low base after the second world war. So 
rather than seeking to explain their performance in 
terms of industrial organisation, Hamilton and 
Biggart sought explanation for the differences in 
organisation that nevetheless achieved the same 
performance. They concluded that a market 
explanations in terms of technology or transaction 
costs could not account for the differences 
between the countries. Nor could explanations in 
terms of culture-particularly given the relatively 
similar cultural traditions of the three countries. 
They concluded that a 'political economy' 
approach, that emphasises government-business 
relations, and structures of authority within the 
business sector, best explained the differences of 
structure between the three countries. 
WHY THE DIVIDED WORLD? 
The relative autonomy of'hierarchy', 'market' and 
'community' and their relationship to individual 
agency, are issues in explanations of social divisions 
such as class, ethnicity and gender. The idea of 
class often involves a mix of subordination, 
economic position, and solidarity. Similarly, ethnic 
conflict typically involves a volatile mixture of 
political subordination, economic inequality, and 
cultural difference. The subordination of women is 
not simply reducible to state action, or economic 
position, or social norms, but some complex and 
persistent combination of all three. Referring to 
Polanyi's idea that the economy is 'embedded' in 
society, Swedberg notes that the task to embed the 
economy has fallen largely on women (1987: 66) 
The triangle itself may be gendered, as in 
Pateman's (1988) famous image of the fraternal 
'sexual contract' that relegated women to the 
'private'-or in our terms 'community'-sphere 
when men contracted with each other to create 
the state. 
As Pateman suggests, the idea that state, society 
and economy can be separated analytically, or in 
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practice, is a characteristically liberal one. Instead, 
we might see the sides of the triangle as expressing 
links and identities, rather than antagonistic 
relationships. Several lines of theory assert the 
fusion diffusion or totality of state, society and 
economy. 
Theories of corporatism criticise the liberal 
idea that state and economy in advanced capitalist 
societies are distinct (Cawson 1978). Not only are 
they interdependent, but they are fused 
institutionally through deals between governments 
and peak associations representing interest groups, 
particularly capital and labour. 
Foucault (1986) describes a distinctively 
modern form of governmentality in which the 
arbitrary but ineffective sovereignty of a monarch 
is replaced by a more dispersed but effective, form 
of'self government'. Rather than state and society 
fusing, as in corporatism, the one is diffused as a 
micromechanism throughout the other. And as 
power (for Foucault) everywhere provokes 
resistance, the state-society relationship becomes 
one of continuing small scale irritations and 
struggles, rather than large scale, to and fro, 
subordination or liberation. 
Marxist theory most famously folds state, 
society and economy into a single 'mode of 
production', and sees the idea that they can be 
separated as a characteristic mystification of the 
capitalist mode of production (Marx 1970: 2-22). 
Thus Mitchell (1991) accuses theorists of state and 
society ideas of assuming that which needs to be 
explained-the idea of a sharp boundary between 
state and society. The triangle becomes 
fundamentally ideological, and the point (he says) 
is to ask how this effect of a separation is achieved: 
how and why is 
a line drawn internally within the network of 
institutional mechanisms through which 
political and social order is maintained (1991: 78). 
The limitations of the triangular model suggest 
other questions for research. Describing the 
relationship between hierarchy, market and 
community as a closed triangle suggests there is a 
kind of fixed quantum of order, variously parcelled 
out among the three models. Alternatively, we 
could ask if a society might be disorganised in all 
three ways: as a market, and hierarchically, and in 
terms of norms and values. We could also ask if the 
relationships can be finely tuned, or are there a 
limited number of possible shapes of the triangle of 
state-economy-society. For example, a 'third way' 
of'market socialism' was discussed 1980s but in the 
event in Eastern Europe there tended to be sharp 
transitions from central planning to the market, as 
in Poland's big bang. It may be that certain 
combinations of state-economy-society are more 
stable than others, and the triangle tends to snap 
into certain shapes, rather than others. 
RATIONAL INDIVIDUALISM? 
As we saw, the distinction between 'state', 'society' 
and 'economy' is partly a consequence of an 
academic division of labour between 'sociology' 
and 'economics', which adopted the model of the 
rational actor as its methodology, and the market as 
its main concern (Friedland and Robertson 
1990: 4-6). Harrison argues that sociology defers 
too much. It 
should not be urging a richer view of 
individual character and of culture upon 
economics conceived of as providing the 
skeleton of theory (quoted in Swedberg 1987: 
110, emphasis added) 
Instead it should be providing alternative-in 
our words 'society centred'-accounts, like 
Harrison's of markets, outlined above. 
This methodological and disciplinary division 
is also related to the two meanings of'economic', 
which Polanyi (1957) distinguished as formal and 
substantive. The substantive meaning has to do 
with the satisfaction of material needs (increasingly, 
as it happens, through various kinds of markets). 
The second is logical, rather than factual, and has 
to do with rational choice between alternatives 
(which may take place in non-market situations). 
Polanyi concluded that the relationship between 
the two is contingent and that 
Outside a system of price-making markets 
economic analysis loses much of its relevance as 
a method of enquiry (1957: 247). 
Since Polanyi was writing, the economic 
approach has been applied more widely, and 
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aggressively, to phenomena such as education much better: 
(Becker 1964) or family structure (Becker 1981) ... their neoclassical counterparts merely 
which were traditionally the province of 
sociologists. So it now seems theoretically possible 
to derive all three models of organisation, not just 
the market, from individualistic, rational choice 
assumptions. For example, altruism may be 
conceived of as a kind of strategic, or long term 
pursuit of self interest. Shared norms and values 
help stabilise expectations of others' behaviour, fill 
out the details of contracts, and allow trade to 
develop on the basis of trust. Or hierarchically 
structured organisations may be explained as a 
response to high transaction costs in market 
exchanges or as a consequence of the growth of 
private self-defence associations. All three models 
can be explained as responses to the 'tragedy of the 
commons', itself a particular form of the more 
general 'prisoners' dilenm1a'. 
While it may be possible to derive all three 
models from economic assumptions, it is not 
necessary to do so. And as yet, economic theories 
of institutions provide a very attenuated model of 
the state, and often draw on a very simple 
evolutionary model of change. 
In relation to the state, the theory of market 
failure identifies the circumstances in which 
individual choices will not add up to the best 
outcome for everyone. It justifies state intervention 
(for example) to 'internalise externalities', by 
insisting on pollution controls, taxing effluents, or 
subsidising training. Developing countries have 
traditionally been assumed to be particularly prone 
to 'market failure' requiring state intervention, but 
as Bates argues 
Traditional development economists suggested 
why private individuals might make socially 
incorrect choices in market settings, but offered 
no theory as to why public intervention would 
lead to better allocations (Bates 1989: 5). 
As Bates suggests, there is no reason in the 
theory of'market failure' to assume the state will 
make superior choices: it may misjudge the value 
of the externalities, or act, or fail to act, for other 
reasons the theory does not try to explain. In any 
case 'it' is hardly a unitary actor. However, 
the neoclassical theory of the state does not do 
substitute a socially pernicious state for one 
that was held to be socially benevolent. 
N ormatively, the two schools were at odds; as 
positive theories they are alike (1989: 5). 
In relation to social change, Granovetter argues 
that economic accounts of institutions often 
depend on evolutionary assumptions, particularly 
that more 'efficient' institutions will-other things 
being equal-survive inefficient ones, and that 
actually existing institutions have therefore survived 
this evolutionary test. He argues that the 
explanation remains metaphorical until a 
mechanism for social change is specified, 
equivalent to biological 'natural selection' acting on 
gene pools (Granovetter 1985: 503). North's later 
work, as we have seen, qualifies a simple 
evolutionary approach by recognising that 'rent 
seeking' groups may acquire a stake in inefficient 
institutions, and resist their dissolution. 
Simplification and metaphor are not inherently 
vicious (this paper is, after all, based on a very 
simple triangular metaphor). Models that explain 
institutions in terms of individuals, or show how 
institutions construct and constrain individual 
choices, have the virtue of connecting the small 
with the large-what Coleman calls the 'micro to 
macro problem' which appears in sociology as a 
problem of transformation, or in political science as 
a problem of social choice (1986: 1320-1). Such 
connections between the micro world of the 
individual and the firm, and the macro world of 
state, society and economy include, for example, 
the relationship between the production choices of 
individual farmers and grander scale processes such 
as 'development'. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The argument so far has been rather abstract 
whereas the 'governance' approach may be most 
useful (for analysts and actors) at the level of 
particular sectors, such as health or environmental 
administration, each with their characteristic 
histories, technologies and 'policy communities' 
(Atkinson and Coleman 1 992). Official and 
unofficial actors within each sector cannot simply 
rely on rules, or self-interested action, or ties of 
affiliation to get what they want, but some mix of 
all three. 
The governance approach extends a simple 
opposition between 'states' and 'markets' by 
introducing a third 'conmmnity' term, and noticing 
that any actual organisation contains a mix of all 
three. It recognises new roles for the state in 
supporting marketisation (such as creating new 
forms of property rights, such as tradable permits, 
or creating the new regulatory agencies that need 
to be put in place to ensure competition among 
privatised utilities). It also offers another route away 
from the state, into non-government, non-market 
'conununity' forms of organisation, and considers 
the conditions of their existence. 
It also suggests some quite specific forms of 
training for officials, and those in private and 
voluntary organisations linked in various ways to 
the state, or crossing the public-private boundary. 
Traditional forms of development administration 
training in devising policies, and ensuring they are 
implemented down a chain of command, need to 
be supplemented by training in negotiation, 
bargaining, contracting, monitoring, regulating, and 
pricing of services suggested by the market model, 
and training in networking, building trust, and 
managing egalitarian informal relationships that the 
community model suggests. 
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State 
Society and 
Governance in 
Melanesia 
THE CHANGING REGION 
Over recent years, the island states and territories of 
the Pacific have faced unprecedented challenges of 
social, economic and political change. Globalization 
has brought new external influences on the 
economies and societies of the region, while the 
island's political systems are adjusting to internal 
pressures which include increasing populations 
with rising expectations, declining administrative 
and service delivery capacities, and limited physical 
endowments. Such changes confront and in some 
cases challenge the very nature of Southwest Pacific 
states and are all critical to the future governance of 
island polities. 
Despite high per capita aid flows, rates of 
economic development have been uneven and per 
capita growth rates low, with widespread problems 
of economic management and service delivery. 
Along with domestic demands, there are pressures 
from donor countries and international financial 
institutions on governments in the region to 
confront these critical long and short term 
development issues, or risk losing external support. 
The State, Society and Governance project will 
examine the nature of those challenges to island 
polities in Melanesia and evaluate the prospects for 
success in meeting and responding to them. 
In particular, the project will examine the 
emergence of new political structures in societies 
with no tradition of centralised power. The core 
concerns involve relations between states and 
societies and challenges to sovereignty in the 
creation of new national entities, and will include 
political representation, public order, violence and 
legitimacy, ethnicity and nationalism. 
RESOURCES 
Recognising the importance of these issues to 
island governments themselves, and to Australia as 
near neighbour and partner in development, The 
Australian National University has entered into 
major new commitments to fund three new 
scholarly positions in this field, and will contribute 
$275,000 per annum to the project from 1996. The 
Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and AusAID have agreed to support the 
project for three years with total funding valued at 
$660,000. 
PLANNED ACTIVITIES 
From June 1996, the Project will initiate a series of 
monthly seminars, aimed at developing discussion 
and debate of critical conceptual and practical 
issues for state, society and governance in 
Southwest Pacific countries. 
Working Papers, associated with these seminars, 
and with a schedule of one-day Workshops, to be 
held twice a year, will generate valuable reference 
material relevant to public, scholarly and policy-
making audiences in the region. 
A large International Conference is planned for a 
Pacific venue in 1998, and will focus on the overall 
themes of state, society and governance in the 
context of globalization. 
Academic publication of books and articles will 
proceed from the continuing work of scholars 
within RSPAS and the Fellows appointed to the 
Project. 
The project involves a strong team of eminent 
scholars, internationally recognised in their own 
respective fields, who support and contribute to the 
work. The Steering Committee comprises: 
Professor Ron Duncan 
(Convenor) 
Mr David Ambrose 
Professor Donald Denoon 
Professor Ross Garnaut 
Dr Margaret Jolly 
Ms Maureen Kattau 
Dr Brij Lal 
Dr Peter Larmour 
DrRon May 
Dr Bill Standish 
Dr IlaTemu 
Dr Darrell Tryon 
Professor R. Gerard Ward 
r- ... 
~ 
Scholars, particularly those 
in the region, interested in 
association with the project 
are encouraged to contact 
the Steering Committee. 
For fi.1rther information 
please contact: 
dai11brose@co0111bs.anu.edtJ.au 
or at RSPAS. 
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